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Massimo Renzo has recently offered a theory of legitimacy that attempts to ground the state’s right to rule on the assumption that people in the state of nature pose an unjust threat to each other and can therefore, in self-defense, be forced to enter the state, that is, to become subject to its authority. I argue that depending on how “unjust threat” is interpreted in Renzo’s self-defense argument for the authority of the state, either his premise that “those who pose an unjust threat to others can be justifiably coerced in self-defense, at least when they are morally responsible for posing the threat,” or his premise that “would-be independents pose an unjust threat to those living next to them in the state of nature,” or both of them are wrong. I further argue that his premise that would-be independents pose an unjust threat by refusing to enter the state is also mistaken. Refusing to enter the state, that is, refusing to be subject to the authority of the state, is no threat at all, and hence coercing people into entering the state is no means of self-defense and incapable of enhancing security. Renzo’s deduction of state authority from the right to self-defense fails.
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I. Introduction: Renzo’s Argument

Massimo Renzo has recently offered “a theory of legitimacy that grounds the state’s right to rule on a natural duty not to harm others” (575).​[1]​ Crucial for his argument is the following thought experiment, which I therefore quote at length:
The Boat Case
Suppose that 20 persons are on a lifeboat. The land is far away and can only be reached if all 20 row together. There is no other way for any of them to survive, for nobody would be able to swim to the land and the current, apparently quite strong, would carry the boat to the land too late (since the food available for each passenger is insufficient).
Suppose now that while 15 passengers want to set up a rowing scheme, the remaining 5 passengers believe that the current is strong enough to carry the boat to the land in time, and therefore refuse to enter this scheme. These 5 passengers do not want to be part of the rowing scheme because they falsely believe that they do not need the benefits provided by it. Nor are the other 15 passengers strong enough to move the boat if the 5 do not do their part. Eventually, of course, the 5 would discover that they were wrong, but by then all the passengers would be too weak to row to the land before the supply of food was depleted. (581, formatting slightly changed.)
… if the 5 were not on board, the boat would be lighter and the remaining 15 passengers would be able to row to the land. This is why the 5 can be said to be posing a threat to the 15 … (582)
The relevance of the boat case lies herein:
I will argue that in this case the 5 passengers have a duty to enter the rowing scheme, while the 15 passengers have both a correlative claim-right that the 5 do so and a liberty-right to enforce this obligation in self-defence. … I will argue that for the same reasons, would-be independents have an enforceable duty to enter the state, which correlates to a claim-right that they do so possessed by those living next to them.​[2]​ (581)
And Renzo explains:
My argument relies on two premises:
(a) those who pose an unjust threat to others can be justifiably coerced in self-defence, at least when they are morally responsible for posing the threat;
(b) by refusing to enter the state, would-be independents pose an unjust threat to those living next to them in the state of nature, and they are morally responsible for posing this threat;
From these two premises we can derive the following conclusion:
(c) would-be independents can be justifiably coerced in self-defence to enter the state. (580)
For the sake of the better exposition of my counter-argument, I will divide premise (b) into three different premises (I will have nothing further to say about the second of them, that is, about [b2]):
(b1) would-be independents pose an unjust threat to those living next to them in the state of nature;
(b2) they are morally responsible for this,
(b3) they pose the unjust threat by refusing to enter the state.
In the following I will distinguish three different interpretations of “unjust threat”: the actualistic, the probabilistic, and the possibilistic (for lack of better words). I will argue that both premise (a) and premise (b1) are false if “unjust threat” is interpreted actualistically. If “unjust threat” is interpreted probabilistically, then this still renders premise (b1) false. If, in turn, “unjust threat” is interpreted in the extremely sweeping possibilistic way, then premise (a) is again false, while premise (b1) would now be correct. Regardless, however, of which of the three interpretations of “unjust threat” one chooses, premise (b3) is wrong in any case. Since there is no plausible interpretation of “unjust threat” in sight that remedies these problems, Renzo’s deduction of state authority from the right to self-defense fails.


II. The actualistic interpretation of “unjust threat”

Let us first have a look at the actualistic interpretation of “unjust threat,” since it would appear that this is Renzo’s preferred interpretation. After all, in the boat example the 5 passengers will, ex hypothesi, actually cause the death of the other 15 passengers if they, the 5, refuse to row. Moreover, that Renzo relies on an actualistic interpretation of threat (according to which someone poses a threat to others if he would actually harm them unless they take defensive measures) is confirmed by his statement that “if the 15 were mistaken and setting up the rowing scheme was objectively unnecessary to have their life saved, they could not justifiably coerce the 5 on self-defence” (584-585). “Objectively unnecessary,” it seems safe to assume, means that the 15 could actually also have saved their lives without the rowing scheme (whether they reasonably believed this to be the case or not; see the whole discussion on p. 584). But if so, then the 5 would not have actually harmed the 15 if the latter had not taken defensive measures against the former. In other words, the 5 would not have been an unjust threat in the actualistic sense.
I claimed that the actualistic interpretation of “unjust threat” makes premise (a) wrong. Why is that? Well, it seems very counter-intuitive to claim that someone can be justifiably coerced into doing something merely because otherwise he would actually harm someone, irrespective of whether people reasonably believe that or not. Consider the boat example again, but with the added condition (which is entirely compatible with the original boat example since it makes no reference to epistemic requirements) that the 15 have not the slightest evidence that they will die if the 5 do not enter the rowing scheme. More precisely, believing that rowing will make any difference is as rational under the circumstances as believing that a giant eagle will grab the boat in its claws and carry all to safety. However, one of the passengers, out of the blue, has the vague suspicion that all will die if the 5 do not join the rowing scheme (which has not been set up for practical reasons, but, let’s say, to please the gods) and infects the other 15 with it. Thus, when the 5 refuse to row (reasonably believing that rowing will kill them and the others sooner, rather than later, due to the excruciating heat of the sun), the 15 start beating the 5 in order to coerce them into rowing. Is this self-defense, let alone justified self-defense?
Intuitively – at least those are my intuitions – it is not. In fact, the action of the 15 seems to be an instance of unjust assault and battery and thus something that the 5 are justified in defending themselves against. Of course, ex hypothesi the 15 are right about what would happen if they do not use coercive means against the 5, but a court, dealing with the charges of assault and battery, can well point out that the 15 don’t know that and could not have known that and were therefore not justified in using violence on grounds of their “gut-feelings” and an interpretation of their tea-leaves. This seems also to be the right position from a moral point of view. People cannot be justified in inflicting severe harm on others only on grounds of their suspicions and irrational fears, not even if the suspicions (unbeknownst to anyone) turn out to be correct.​[3]​ 
To be sure, Renzo can simply insist on an actualistic interpretation of self-defense. Yet, it is worth noting that such an account of self-defense is – although occasionally defended by a few legal scholars – (as far as I can see) unanimously rejected by Western jurisdictions, which all require a knowledge, “awareness” (where knowledge or awareness is more than suspicion or guessing) or reasonability requirement of one form or another for justified self-defense.​[4]​ (A reasonability requirement need not stipulate that the defender herself must reasonably believe certain measures to be necessary to defend herself; rather, it can stipulate that those measures must be reasonable from the perspective of an informed – although not omniscient – observer. The reasonability requirements can be more or less demanding.) In any case, it would appear that a theory of the authority of the state and its laws that is based on an account of self-defense that the very jurisdictions whose authority the theory tries to establish reject is dubious at best. 
I said that also premise (b1) would be unwarranted if one used the actualistic interpretation of “unjust threat.” The reason for this is that it is not credible that all or even the vast majority of people would pose a threat of unjust harm to others in the actualistic sense: that is, it is not credible that they will all (or most of them) actually unjustly harm someone. At least this is the case if we use a fairly common understanding of “unjustly harming.” For example, most observers would claim that people in Denmark or Sweden get old without unjustly harming their fellow citizens, and anarchists disputing Renzo’s argument would add that this is so although people in Denmark and Sweden are in the state of nature – which would show that the state of nature is not that dangerous after all. 
Of course, Renzo might simply deny this and claim that the fact that people in Denmark or Sweden get old without unjustly harming their fellow citizens is due to the alleged fact that people in Denmark or Sweden are not living in a state of nature. Note, however, that by a “state of nature” Renzo merely means a state of affairs where people are not “subject to the authority of the state” (see the discussion on pp. 586-587), and according to him individuals “are subject to the authority of the state when the laws of the state provide them with content-independent peremptory reasons for action, i.e., reasons to perform the acts commanded by the state simply because they are commanded by it” (575-576). He further explains that these “reasons are ‘content-independent’ in that they are supposed to function as reasons irrespective of the merit of the action required: we are supposed to act as commanded whether or not we have reason to act on the content of the command,” and that they “are ‘peremptory’ in that they cut off or preempt deliberation: we are supposed to act as commanded without assessing the merits of the action in question” (575, n. 3). Or, in less technical terms, “independents,” that is, those who refuse to “enter” the state in the relevant sense (which is compatible with residing on its territory) and thus remain in the state of nature, “would have no duty to obey [the state’s] laws” (only because they are the laws) (593).
However, this is of course precisely what anarchists claim: citizens and people residing on the territory of the state are not under a duty to obey the state’s laws (only because they are the laws). Thus, they claim that people in Denmark and Sweden are in a state of nature in the relevant sense.​[5]​ If so, the state of nature seems to be not nearly as bad as Renzo is painting it (see 585-592), and thus the citizens are not posing a threat to each other.
To counter this claim by simply insisting that people in Denmark and Sweden, for example, do normally not pose threats to each other because they are subject to the authority of the law and therefore to the state’s right to rule would obviously be question-begging in the context of an argument that tries to explain “what justifies the state’s right to rule over its subjects” (575) in the first place by an appeal to the idea that people in reasonably just states normally do not pose threats to each other because they are subject to the state’s right to rule.​[6]​ Thus, Renzo would need an independent argument that shows that the relative security in states like Sweden and Denmark can only be explained by the authority these states have over their subjects and not, alternatively, by the compatibility of the state of nature (in Renzo’s sense) with relative security. We will see in the next section that Renzo indeed tries to offer such an argument. However, since we will also see that this argument fails, premise (b1) remains indeed unwarranted.


III. How is authority going to save us?

According to premise (b3) the independents or anarchists pose the unjust threat by refusing to enter the state. Therefore, coercing them in self-defense into entering the state would remove this threat. I will argue in this section that this is mistaken.
Renzo states:
Saying that would-be independents can be “justifiably coerced to enter the state” is to say that it is justifiable to coercively subject them to the authority of the state. … this means two things: first, the very fact that the state commands them to act in a certain way creates new obligations for them to do so; second, the state can coercively enforce these newly created obligations. (580-581)
Yet, how exactly is subjecting people to the state’s authority, in the sense that they are now under an enforceable moral duty to obey the law (simply because it is the law), supposed to solve the security problem? Or, conversely, how does people’s not being subject to the state’s authority create the alleged security problem in the first place? This is Renzo’s answer to this question:
If there were individuals living on its territory who were not subject to its authority, it would not be possible for the state to establish and enforce a stable set of rules, nor would it be possible for it to adjudicate those conflicts that are likely to arise any time that these rules are infringed. Since these individuals would not treat its laws as authoritative, all the state could do is use force against them in the same way force is used against enemies in the state of nature; but it would not be able to perform those standard-setting and dispute-solving tasks which are indispensable to guarantee a peaceful and secure coexistence for those living in proximity to each other. (587)
But why not? Renzo himself mentions an obvious objection, namely that the “state will be able to perform its functions by using straightforward coercion against these individuals” (594). Yes, indeed. Nonetheless, Renzo claims:
The problem, however, is that if independents were allowed to exist within the territory of the state, others could not reasonably expect that the laws of the state would be obeyed. For surely this expectation largely depends on the fact that we normally assume that everyone living on the territory of the state is subject to its authority. (594)
“Surely”? I, for one, do not make this assumption at all, yet I do not feel more insecure for that, that is, I do not have the “expectation” that my safety will be reduced by the existence of independents. Conversely, I would not feel any securer if people suddenly became subject to the authority of the state. Consider, for example, this case: You are on vacation in the forests of Sweden, far away from civilization, and suddenly someone crosses your path whom you recognize as a well-known philosophy professor and philosophical anarchist. Would you be scared out of your wits, draw your knife, and try to coerce him into “entering the state,” in order to feel safer? I doubt it.
Thus, there is simply no discernible reason why you should consider the philosophical anarchist as a threat. Why and how is the philosophy professor in our example a threat? Vague and abstract reference to “coordination problems” (586, 588, 591) does not really provide an answer, especially since such problems can be solved without subjecting anyone to the authority of the state.
In this context, note that Renzo does not explain what would count as successfully having coerced someone into subjecting himself to the authority of the state. Would he have to promise that he will from now on obey the law only because it is the law? But is a coerced promise valid? Moreover, is a promise to obey something only because it is the law not as irresponsible and morally void as promising someone to do whatever he asks? Are such promises really supposed to be binding? Given quite reasonable answers to these questions, it might well be impossible to coerce someone into subjecting herself to the authority of the law or the state. But then Renzo’s theory already fails for this reason alone.
However, it has been suggested to me​[7]​ that the way in which we coerce people to enter the state is by simply treating them (whether they want this or not) as members of the group to which the two conditions already mentioned apply: first, “the very fact that the state commands them to act in a certain way creates new obligations for them to do so; second, the state can coercively enforce these newly created obligations.” Yet, first, we do not normally think that the mere fact that some organization treats persons as though it can boss them around (think of the mafia) confers upon them an obligation to actually follow the organization’s commands. If it is simply claimed that this is different in the case of the state, then this again begs the question against the anarchist.
Second, a corollary of this account of forcing someone to enter the state seems to be that people who are not treated in the way described (although they reside on the state’s territory) are not subject to the state’s authority (if they have not entered the state in other ways, for example by consent, if that is possible). Thus, if some survivalist militia and its members claim a certain territory for themselves, tell the state not to meddle in their affairs, and the state actually does as it is told (perhaps in order to avoid confrontations), that is, does not collect taxes or enforce property or firearms laws, then, all else being equal, the militia is not under a moral obligation to obey the state’s law only because it is the law. While this may please the anarchist, it seems to be a rather unusual conclusion for a statist account. Instead of being able to chastise the militia for not acting according to their political obligations towards the state, it would now have to be conceded that it and its members do not have such obligations.
If, on the other hand, it is claimed that the members of the militia are under such an obligation anyway, whether the state forces them into entering the state or not, then coercion and self-defense no longer seem to have anything to do with this obligation and are therefore incapable of explaining it.
Thus, it seems that Renzo owes us a clear and detailed account not only of how to enter the state but of how one can be coerced into entering the state; and he must demonstrate that this account does not undermine the premises of his own argument.
 Be that as it may, let us, for the sake of argument, assume that it is possible to coerce someone into subjecting himself to the authority of the state by coercing him to promise to subject himself to its authority. Still the question remains as to how your coercing the anarchist philosophy professor into entering the state improves your situation. Why should you feel safer now? If you had no particular reason before to think that the professor will do you any harm or disobey reasonable laws (he is a philosophical anarchist, not a militant political anarchist), it would seem that there is simply no difference. (In fact, if you assault him “in self-defense” with your knife to make him promise to enter the state, he is on Swedish self-defense law permitted to use necessary and proportionate defensive force against you. It would seem that it is less threatening to encounter a philosophical anarchist than a “defensive” Renzonian “archist.”)
Conversely, suppose in the woods you encounter another internationally well-known anarchist; in this case, however, he is also well-known for being a serial murderer, who especially targets hikers in forests. Would you feel – and be – any safer if you succeeded into coercing him into “entering the state,” for example by way of making him promise to obey the laws? You shouldn’t – because you aren’t.
Moreover, from the fact that certain (or all) individuals in a state are not subject to the state’s authority it does certainly not follow, contrary to what Renzo suggests, that “these individuals would not treat its laws as authoritative.” You can treat something as authoritative without it being authoritative. You can wrongly believe that it is authoritative and act accordingly. Furthermore, even without treating it as authoritative in Renzo’s sense, you can simply comply with it out of habit, or because it is practical and, indeed, helps to solve co-ordination problems. You can also comply with it because of peer pressure and in order to avoid retaliation by others, and, of course, you can comply with it because you are coerced to do so by the state. In other words, you can, for all kinds of reasons, follow the “commands” or laws of the state as if they were “content-independent” and “peremptory,” that is, you can follow them without further considering their content or engaging in further deliberation. To do so, however, you need not believe that you are under a moral obligation to treat them this way. And you can certainly treat them this way without being under such an obligation.
In any case, moral obligations by themselves (in contrast to even mistaken beliefs about moral obligations) are not causally effective. Nor is the absence of moral obligations causally effective. Consequently, moral obligations can play no coordinative function whatsoever. Accordingly, they or their absence cannot pose, or contribute to someone posing, a threat. If someone wants to kill you, it might help you to make him believe that he should not kill you (whether that belief would be correct or not), but it will certainly not help you to merely impose the obligation itself on him. (All mass murderers in history were under an obligation not to commit mass murder: that didn’t save their victims. To believe in the causal effectiveness of moral obligations or their absence seems to be little more than a belief in moral magic.) In other words, people do not pose threats by not having certain moral obligations; people pose threats by the causal effects they (are likely to) have. Therefore, imposing moral obligations upon people cannot remove threats or be a means of self-defense. Thus, premise (b3) is wrong, and hence the state’s authority cannot save us: as far as our security is concerned, the state’s authority is useless.


IV. The probabilistic interpretation of “unjust threat”

Let us now turn to the probabilistic interpretation of unjust threat. I argued above that Renzo seems to prefer the actualistic interpretation of “unjust threat.” Yet, on the other hand, he also explicitly follows Jeff McMahan and suggests “that the criterion of liability to necessary and proportionate force in self-defense is ‘moral responsibility, through action that lacks objective justification, for a threat of unjust harm to others’” (583).​[8]​ However, in order to avoid counter-intuitive implications (like making all conscientious drivers liable to self-defensive measures by pedestrians), McMahan once made it very clear that as long as the threat (in the sense of the imposition of a risk of wrongful harm) that a conscientious driver poses to pedestrians remains below a certain threshold, such a threat makes one not liable to defensive measures: “voluntary engagement in an activity known to impose a risk of wrongful harm, even if the ex ante risk is very low [as in the case of conscientiously driving a car], is a basis of liability to defensive action if the probability of wrongful harm becomes unexpectedly high.”​[9]​ In other words, if the driver’s car veers out of control and now the risk that it will run the pedestrian over becomes very high, the pedestrian is allowed to kill the driver if this is necessary to remove the threat, but not already before that, that is, while the driving remains within normal parameters, so to speak. Nor are pedestrians allowed to force drivers to stop so that they do not pose a risk to others anymore. That would not be self-defense, but a violation of the right of the drivers to impose very moderate risks on others with their everyday activities. One way of terminologically capturing this account of liability in words is to say that to impose a risk of harm on someone so that the harm would be unjust if it occurred does not yet render the imposition of such a risk itself unjust: it does not render this imposition of harm an unjust threat.
The probabilistic element of this account might perhaps, given a suitable interpretation, be able to play the role of the awareness or reasonableness condition a plausible account of self-defense should have and therefore escape the objection leveled above against the actualistic account. However, it should be noted that Renzo overlooks the fact that McMahan’s account is, strictly speaking, not an account of justified self-defense but one of liability to self-defensive force,​[10]​ and justification and liability are not the same.​[11]​ Furthermore, there are serious problems with McMahan’s account of liability to defensive force.​[12]​ These issues need not detain us here, though. For the sake of argument I will just grant that the probabilistic interpretation of “unjust threat” makes premise (a) true. 
Yet, premise (b1) would still be false. The reasons are exactly the same as in the case of the actualistic interpretation of “unjust threat”: by and large, the Danish and Swedish, who, according to the anarchist, are not subject to the authority of the law, neither pose “unjust threats” to each other in the actualistic sense nor in the probabilistic sense. Most Swedish and Danish simply never cross the probability threshold that would make self-defensive measures against them justified. And, again, if one were to counter this objection by simply claiming that the Swedish and Danish do not cross this threshold because the anarchist claim is wrong, that is, because the Swedish and Danish​[13]​ actually are subject to the authority of the law, then this counter-claim would, for the reasons already given, be question-begging. Since, moreover, as we saw in the last section, Renzo’s explanation for why the relative security in “reasonably just states” can only be explained by the authority these states have over their subjects is mistaken, the probabilistic interpretation of “unjust threat” is also incapable of supporting premise (b1).
Note that it will not do to object that the harm is not probabilistic but actual, namely the alleged harm that we suffer because coordination is compromised.​[14]​ Renzo’s own explicit premises refer to unjust threats, not to harms. Thus, it is irrelevant whether there is any actual harm as long as this harm does not come in the form of an unjust threat. After all, conscientious drivers also “harm” other people (and each other) by “compromising” road safety. Yet, as long as they do not compromise road safety to such a degree as to pose an unjust threat, “defensive” means against them are not justified according to the probabilistic account. At this point Renzo might be inclined to use the actualistic account again and to combine it with interpreting any compromising of road safety as an unjust threat (which would be dramatically different from the situation in the boat example).​[15]​ However, such a combination would then again make premise (a) incorrect, as our discussion here of the conscientious driver already showed: you are not permitted to “defend” yourself against the conscientious driving of conscientious drivers by forcing them to stop their conscientious driving and enter the state of the pedestrian. 


V. The possibilistic interpretation of self-defense











I had submitted the paper above to Law and Philosophy. It got rejected. However, the reviewer’s comments left me rather unimpressed. Thus, for the benefit of the reader, I will reprint here the reviewer’s comments in full and insert my comments in bold:

This paper aims to refute Massimo Renzo's argument for state legitimacy. Unfortunately, I find the argument unsuccessful primarily because it seems to misconstrue Renzo's argument and consequently misses its target. In a nutshell, Renzo's argument is that political authority can be grounded in a natural duty not to (cause) harm. This argument rests on two main premises: a) it is justified to coerce someone in order to prevent them from imposing an unjust threat on you and b) would-be independents (i.e. people who refuse to enter and obey the state) pose such a threat. That is precisely what I say about Renzo’s argument, so it is unclear to me how I “misconstrue” it. 
The author of this paper claims to refute both these premises although the argument focuses on the second as far as I can see. The argument is not valid because it rests on an assumption that is not present in Renzo's argument, namely that the state already exists. This comment of the reviewer is badly confused. I will return to this in the context of the reviewer’s elaboration of it. Let me elaborate. 
First the author wants to argue against Renzo's premise that 'by refusing to enter the state, would-be independents pose an unjust threat to those living next to them in the state of nature'. In order to do that, the author 'divides' the premise into 3 different ones (see p. 3) and essentially only argues that it is false that would-be independents pose a threat to those living next to them in the state of nature. No, I most definitely don’t essentially only argue that; rather, I argue, as stated above, the following: “… both premise (a) and premise (b1) are false if “unjust threat” is interpreted actualistically. If “unjust threat” is interpreted probabilistically, then this still renders premise (b1) false. If, in turn, “unjust threat” is interpreted in the extremely sweeping possibilistic way, then premise (a) is again false, while premise (b1) would now be correct. Regardless, however, of which of the three interpretations of “unjust threat” one chooses, premise (b3) is wrong in any case. Since there is no plausible interpretation of “unjust threat” in sight that remedies these problems, Renzo’s deduction of state authority from the right to self-defense fails.” Thus, far from me misconstruing Renzo’s argument, the reviewer misconstrues mine. But this way of decomposing Renzo's premise misconstrues his argument. No, it doesn’t. Renzo does not claim that the existence of (some isolated) independents poses a threat to those living next to them. I am confused. If those independents don’t pose a threat at all, how can it be justified to subject them to self-defensive force? Self-defense against what? His argument is rather that 'by refusing to enter the state, anarchists prevent the state from performing its legislative, executive and judicial functions, which are necessary in order to have a minimal level of order and security' (Renzo, 2011, p. 578). Indeed, so by refusing to enter the state anarchists do prevent the state from performing its functions and thereby pose a threat. If they don’t thereby or in some other way pose a threat, they cannot be coerced in self-defense. Perhaps the reviewer thinks that I suppose that Renzo assumes that independents and anarchists would pose a more direct threat, namely, let’s say, by being particularly prone to violence. But I don’t say that, and I don’t think it. I merely point out, quite accurately, that according to Renzo independents pose a threat, and I argue that Renzo is wrong on that. Nobody meeting an independent anarchist in the Swedish forest will think that he, the non-anarchist, will now, due to the existence of this anarchist, become the victim of the collapse of society. Nobody believes that because there is, pace Renzo, absolutely no reason to believe it. In order words, Renzo assumes that the state is not possible without everyone's (on the territory) being subject to its authority. This assumption may be wrong but this is not what the author argues against Oh yes, this is definitely one of the things I argue against, for example in section III – on which the reviewer has little to say. My argument is that political obligation is causally ineffective, and can therefore in no way contribute to the effectiveness with which a state performs its function. My argument thus is, quite explicitly, that political obligation is entirely useless when it comes to ensuring security. To illustrate this with Renzo’s boat example: if the 5 row but do not have an obligation to row, all will be saved. If the 5 are subjected to an obligation to row (perhaps by promising or by God’s power to subject people to duties) but do not row anyway, they will all die. Again, obligation, in the boat as much as in the state, is useless. That is one of my arguments against Renzo’s – therefore palatably false -- claim that the state cannot perform its function without everyone (on the territory) being subject to its authority. Fascinatingly, the reviewer chooses to ignore it; rather, he argues the independents do not pose a threat to people already living in an effective state. Furthermore, the arguments put forward by the author are weak. My guess is, again, that the reviewer does not quite understand them. One argument - against Renzo's first premise - is that an 'actualistic' interpretation of 'unjust threat' cannot support Renzo's claim. Renzo wants to claim that only if the bad consequences of the independents' refusal to join 'actually' occurred, the threat would be real and self-defence would be justified. Against this, the author argues essentially that this is not a sufficient condition; it must be accompanied by a reasonable belief that they will materialise. But Renzo need not deny this. What he denies is precisely the same thing that the author insists on, namely that 'people cannot be justified in inflicting severe harm in others only on grounds of their suspicions and irrational fears' (p. 5, emphasis added). In other words, Renzo's claim is that actual harm is a necessary condition for treating a threat as an unjust one and not that it is a sufficient one. I was laboring under the assumption that Renzo tries to justify state legitimacy under an appeal to self-defense. This, however, cannot be done – for obvious logical reasons – if he only states necessary conditions for self-defense against independents and not sufficient conditions as well. My point in criticizing the actualistic interpretation was precisely that the fact that someone is an unjust threat does not yet justify using self-defensive force against him, contrary to what premise (a) suggests. Thus, I pointed out – again explicitly – that the actualistic interpretation of premise (a) makes this premise wrong. The reviewer does not provide any counter-argument but simply misses the point. 
The arguments put forward to refute Renzo's second premise are similarly unconvincing. The aim here is to show that would-be independents do not pose a threat to people living next to them and to support this claim the author puts forward a number of examples that are either unclear or misconceived. One example involves citizens of Sweden and Denmark whose getting old might or might not harm their fellow citizens. Seriously? I don’t talk about their getting old harming or not harming anyone, I say that they get old without (unjustly) harming anyone – that is, they don’t (unjustly) harm anyone in their entire life. It is unclear to me what the point of this example is. The point of this example is (and I explicitly stated that that’s the point, so the reviewer really does not need to brood over it): if anarchists are right in claiming that citizens (all or most citizens, not only the anarchist ones) do not have a political obligation to obey the law, then Sweden and Denmark are living proof for the fact that one does not need political obligation to live safely, because people do live quite safely there. I further claimed that to simply deny the anarchist premise (by claiming that people in Denmark and Sweden are subject to the state’s authority and therefore safe) is to beg the question. Renzo has to support such a denial by argument. However, in fact he merely claims, but nowhere shows, that political obligation is necessary for the state’s performing its function of providing security. I, in contrast, do argue in section III that political obligation is unnecessary. It is unnecessary because obligations are not causally effective. Another example involves a philosophical anarchist on vacation in Sweden. The point the author is making here is that encountering a philosophy professor with anarchist views would not make him/her feel less secure. But this point misses its target. First, the question is of course not how people would feel but whether the existence of independents would actually pose a threat. Well, I suppose then that the point is of course also not what people “expect” – yet, Renzo does appeal to their “expectations” in the quote I provided above. Therefore, I think I am entitled to point out that Renzo’s claims about what people would expect are implausible. Second, this example appears to assume the existence of a state, which is - as I explained above - illicit in this context. I have already addressed this issue above. Moreover, what changes if the wanderer becomes a sailor and meets the professor on the high sea? Nothing. So it is unnecessary to assume the existence of a state here. And finally, the fact that the philosophy professor has anarchist views does not show that he is not subject to the power of the state in question (Sweden, in this case). This last point indicates some conceptual confusion. Well, in my example the professor is obviously, ex exemplo, supposed to be an independent. Besides, if my example betrays “conceptual confusion,” then Renzo’s obvious assumption that the 5 people in the boat example are not yet subject to the scheme because they “refuse” to enter it, because they “do not want to be part of the rowing scheme,” betrays a conceptual confusion too. After all, that they do not want to be part of the rowing scheme does not show that they are not part of it and obligated by it already. In any case, if according to Renzo or the reviewer all people, including anarchists, are subject to the authority of the state anyway, then an argument from self-defense is not needed in the first place. Since they already inevitably are in the state in the sense of being subjected to its authority, one can hardly force them to “enter” the state (in fact, the whole talk about “entering the state” would be grossly misleading). Finally, simply presupposing that the professor is subject to the authority of the state indicates some question-begging on the part of the reviewer.
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